Introduction: State Formation in Palestine by Khan, Mushtaq
The crisis-ridden progress in Palestinian state formation since the signing of
the Oslo Agreements raises important questions about reform priorities and
the future prospects of constructing a viable Palestinian state. Were the
obstacles to progress primarily due to poor governance and poor leadership
on the Palestinian side, how far have corruption and the weakness of
democracy in the Palestinian Authority been responsible, and what were the
effects of the economic and political relationships between Israel and the
emerging Palestinian state? This book examines these key questions, and
challenges the widely prevalent view that the Palestinian Authority collapsed
because of its internal governance failures, its lack of commitment to
democracy, and its failure to control corruption. 
It argues that the analytical framework of “good governance” is not
appropriate for assessing state performance in developing countries, and that
it is especially inappropriate in conflict and post-conflict situations. Instead,
an alternative framework is proposed for assessing state performance in a
context of economic and social transformation. This is then applied in detail
to different aspects of state formation in Palestine to show that while there
were indeed internal failures of governance, the institutional architecture set
up by the Oslo agreements established an asymmetric Israeli control over the
emerging Palestinian state and this was responsible for many of the most
serious failures of governance.
This architecture is based on Israel’s insistence on security first, and since
this is not likely to change soon, the analysis has important implications for
the prospects of Palestinian state formation.
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Achievements, constraints and prospects for the future
The historic significance of the Oslo Agreement signed by the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in 1993 was that this was the first
time that Israel formally recognized, even if only in part, the national aspira-
tions of the Palestinian people. Many Palestinians believed that Israel had
implicitly accepted the necessity of creating a fully fledged Palestinian state
on 1967 borders. But the exercise eventually ended in the failure of Camp
David and the commencement of the Second Intifada of 2000. Our analysis
of Palestinian state formation in the period after 1994 identifies a number of
key external and internal factors that contributed to the eventual failure.
The Road Map announced in 2003 retained many of these damaging
elements, without enjoying the goodwill or the relative political stability that
made Oslo appear so promising at the time. Thus, the impasse reached in
2000 raises questions of great importance for the future. Was the failure due
to poor Palestinian governance, poor leadership on one or both sides, or the
economic and political relationships that Israel sought to construct with the
emerging Palestinian state under the aegis of Oslo? In particular, what role
did the quality of governance as measured by corruption, rent-seeking and
the weakness of democracy within the Palestinian Authority play in the
eventual crisis? These questions are not just important for the historical
record; they are critical for assessing the prospects of constructing a viable
Palestinian state in the future.
The Palestinian Authority (the PA, often also referred to as the
Palestinian National Authority or PNA) was established in 1994.1 It had the
unenviable task of first ensuring security for Israel while, in the interim
period, it only controlled a number of non-contiguous population centres in
the occupied territories, with authority over health, education, social
services and tourism, the power to raise direct taxes and to elect a represen-
tative council. The PNA did not control its external borders, it lacked
territorial contiguity, and it lacked meaningful sovereignty over its own land,
water, minerals, airspace or even access to the sea. Yet, it had many of the
symbols and trappings of a state (such as passports, stamps, car number
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plates, an international airport, ministries, police and security forces, and
other public institutions)2. In substance, however, it was actually a limited
self-government with very limited administrative, security and legislative
powers over limited areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBG). The
Israeli occupation continued over East Jerusalem, some 60 per cent of the
area of the West Bank, and just over 25 per cent of the area of the Gaza
Strip. Israeli settlements remained atop every strategic hilltop and vital
aquifer in the West Bank, breaking up the PNA’s territories into a series of
non-contiguous and water-scarce plots. Nevertheless, the PNA was more
than a municipal government because it was established following the three
agreements signed between the PLO and Israel between September 1993 and
September 1995, as an interim measure, awaiting the results of final status
negotiations.3 Its supporters believed it to be the future Palestinian state in
embryonic form, which would take over as Israel withdrew, as they believed
it must, from all the territories it occupied in 1967 in line with UN
Resolutions 242 and 338. In mid 1999, the population of the WBG was esti-
mated at 3,019,704, including East Jerusalem.4 The majority of this
Palestinian population in the occupied areas came under the jurisdiction of
the PNA, with the exception of East Jerusalem and areas that remained
under Israeli control.5
The amount of land the Palestinians would eventually get was left for
final status negotiations, as were all the difficult questions including the
status of East Jerusalem, the refugees, and the Jewish settlements in the
occupied territories. The Palestinians believed that by signing the
Agreements, Israel had accepted that it would have to withdraw to the inter-
nationally recognized 1967 borders. But even if it did, the Palestinians would
still barely be getting 22 per cent of historic Palestine. Even this best-case
scenario, and the process through which it was to be achieved, was highly
controversial from the Palestinian perspective. The international sponsors of
the PNA recognized this, since they prioritized assistance to the Authority to
immediately set up a massive Palestinian internal security force. But while
the Authority acquired the power to police its population, it lacked powers
to police its borders and negotiate independent trade agreements; it did not
have its own currency and it could not define citizenship. As a result, its
economic survival and its relationship with the outside world were
controlled by Israel in ways that often worsened the already vulnerable situa-
tion of many Palestinians. This superstructure needs to be explicitly
recognized in any objective attempt to evaluate governance under the PNA
or to identify areas of weakness where reform priorities should be directed.
While the PNA lacked many of the fundamental characteristics of a
state, the fact that it could legitimately exercise violence to maintain social
order within the territories it controlled gave it a state-like quality. Moreover,
Palestinians perceived many of its political and economic interventions as
the actions of their emerging state. At the same time, from the outset, there
was an internal Palestinian critique of the PNA’s quality of governance,
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coming from across the Palestinian political spectrum. These critiques
pointed out a number of areas of concern, including a widespread percep-
tion of corruption, of human rights abuses in arrests and interrogations, the
lack of attention given to developing democratic procedures, and of the
emergence of monopolies and cartels that were distorting the market against
the interests of consumers and small producers. These internal Palestinian
critiques were pointing out the slow progress towards the goals of the
Palestinian state formation process from a Palestinian perspective. In
contrast, a related critique of the Authority began to emerge from the ‘good
governance’ school and the related neo-patrimonial framework that identi-
fied a number of these same characteristics as causes of economic
stagnation and political crisis. There is no question that the problems of
corruption and weak democracy in the PNA were real and undesirable. The
question is rather about the causes and consequence of these problems, so
that the most important factors can be prioritized for policy. We will argue
that both the good governance and neo-patrimonial frameworks are seri-
ously inadequate for assessing the achievements and failures of governance
under the PNA, or for identifying the lessons to be learnt for the future.
Our argument is therefore both about methods of analysis and about
assessing the historical evidence. On the method of analysis, we question
the usefulness of the good governance and neo-patrimonial frameworks in
the context of developing countries, and particularly in contexts of conflict,
such as the Palestinian one. We argue that to evaluate the problems of
governance in such contexts requires a framework that takes account of the
fact that developing states face challenges that are quite different from the
service-delivery tasks appropriate for advanced country states. States in
developing countries are frequently and necessarily engaged in recon-
structing their societies and economies and thereby overseeing far-reaching
processes of social transformation. In particular, processes of creating a
capitalist sector are always intensely contested, and there are inevitably
winners and losers. In contexts such as that of Palestine, we also have
intense colonial-type conflicts between a colonial power and a colonized
population. To assess governance in these developmental contexts, we
propose an alternative framework derived from the experience of economic
and social transformation in developing countries. This framework focuses
on the ‘transformation’ capacities of states and the potential of developing
these capacities. It provides a very different set of criteria for assessing
areas of strength and weakness in the Palestinian administration. It is likely
to be of wider interest in the Middle East, and in other developing coun-
tries. We then use this framework to assess the historical evidence of
Palestinian state formation.
Chapter 1 by Khan sets out the analytical and empirical approaches that
are developed in this book. It begins by questioning the appropriateness of
the good governance and neo-patrimonial approaches applied to developing
countries. These models are based on an underlying mainstream economics
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model where the existence of ‘rents’ signals economic inefficiency. ‘Rent’ is a
term used by economists to describe incomes that are higher than those
possible in a competitive market. In most cases, rents therefore refer to politi-
cally generated incomes, since political intervention is the most obvious way
in which ‘above normal’ incomes are generated. Rents include monopoly
profits, and subsidies and transfers of all types, where political power is used
to create privileged incomes for some. ‘Good governance’, in the mainstream
political economy tradition, is achieved if institutional structures prevent the
emergence of rents and the associated rent-seeking activities. Anti-corruption
strategies and the support for democracy have an instrumental value in this
analysis. Corruption is illegal rent-seeking, where the state is bribed to create
or maintain privileged incomes, or to allocate privileged resources in partic-
ular ways. Anti-corruption strategies are expected to reduce this illegal
rent-seeking. It is also theoretically assumed that it will become more difficult
to create rents if we have a democracy, because rents by definition always
benefit a minority. The good governance argument is that to have a vibrant
market economy, governance reforms have to tackle corruption, establish
democracy, and liberalize the economy at the same time. The neo-patrimonial
argument is closely related. It argues that rents are widespread in developing
countries because of pre-modern and personalized political institutions and
cultures. These allow unaccountable leaders to create rents for themselves
and their clients, with the same damaging economic and political conse-
quences.
In contrast to these theories, we argue that an examination of the histor-
ical evidence of economic transformation in developing countries tells us
that rents are pervasive in all developing countries, and they have to be.
While some rents are damaging, many other rents are essential for orga-
nizing the economic transformation that creates a capitalist economy, and
for political stabilization. In conflict and post-conflict situations, the impor-
tance of rents for managing political stabilization is even more marked. It
follows that in developing and conflict societies we have to examine the
determinants of different types of rents. Compared to the attractive
simplicity of the good governance agenda that tries to achieve a rent-free
competitive market, with relatively simple institutional and political reforms,
the real world demands are more complex. From this perspective, the task of
state-building and of reform is indeed to attack the institutional and polit-
ical factors that induce the creation of damaging rents. But at the same time,
and no less importantly, reform has to promote institutions and political
arrangements that allow the creation and management of rents that are
essential for economic transformation and political stabilization.
Accelerating economic development requires interventions and rent-
creation that accelerates the emergence of a viable capitalist class, and
supports and regulates its development. States also have to carry out signifi-
cant redistributions to maintain political stability, often having to use
patron–client networks to achieve stabilization. This too requires significant
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rent-creation and rent-management capacities. In Palestine, there were addi-
tional limits on what the ‘state’ could do that were set by external powers.
These external constraints ensured that important rents were controlled by
external powers, and this significantly affected the way in which PNA insti-
tutions operated. We argue that some of these external constraints played a
critical role in blocking state formation in Palestine, and this has important
implications for state formation strategies in the future.
We apply this framework to the Palestinian context to identify the
strengths and weaknesses of the Palestinian quasi-state set up in 1994. Our
method is to start with an investigation of the dominant types of rents that
characterized the Palestinian economy and polity. What were the major
resource flows and rents that describe the activities of the quasi-state? This
information helps us to identify some of the main characteristics and capaci-
ties of the PNA, as well as identifying some of the directions in which it was
likely to evolve. Some of the most important resources that were critical for
the survival of the Palestinian quasi-state were controlled by Israel as a
deliberate feature of the security architecture negotiated under Oslo. The
bulk of Palestinian fiscal revenues was collected and transferred to the
Palestinians by Israel; Palestinian trade was controlled by Israel in ways that
allowed Israeli trading monopolies to extract rents from Palestinian
consumers, and Palestinian labour movements, to Israel and even within the
Palestinian territories, were rigorously controlled. These restrictions meant
that resources that were critical for the survival of the Palestinian quasi-state
were transferred to it in the form of rents controlled by Israel, and this leads
us to argue that Israel’s intention was to create a client state. Although
neither side used this term for obvious reasons, the Palestinian leadership
implicitly accepted the necessity of these Israeli controls over the economy
for an indefinite period. It was clear to them that they had no option but to
accept these conditions and prove that they could deliver security to Israel’s
satisfaction.
But to assess the viability of the client-state strategy, we need to ask why
Israel wanted to maintain these types of controls over the emerging
Palestinian state, and this too is discussed further in Chapter 1 by Khan.
Security behind recognized international borders does not necessarily
require a client state in a neighbouring country, particularly given the mili-
tary balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians. One possibility is
that Israel foresaw the permanent presence of Jewish settlements throughout
the Palestinian territories. Ensuring the security of a myriad of enclaves
would make it necessary to have a client state on a permanent basis in
Palestine. Or even worse, perhaps Israel’s political classes believed that a
Palestinian state would not solve the ‘Palestinian problem’ from their
perspective, since the problem of the refugees and of Israel’s internal
Palestinians would remain. If this was the concern, Israel’s long-term
strategic interests might have demanded the creation of an unviable or
dependent client state, which could be relied on to assist in the long-run
Introduction 5
management of other aspects of the Palestinian problem. If so, the two sides
may have had very inconsistent expectations about the type of Palestinian
state that was to be constructed. While we do not know precisely why Israel
insisted on developing and maintaining the controls that we describe as the
client-state system of rents, we do know that it did (and this system is the
subject of Chapter 3 by Zagha and Zomlot).
Even though Israel insisted on retaining control over critical Palestinian
rents, we argue (in Chapter 1 by Khan) that these arrangements may never-
theless have allowed substantial Palestinian economic growth, but only if
Israel had allowed rapid economic integration of the Palestinian territories
with the Israeli economy. Of course, this would not be possible if the Israeli
intention was to create an unviable state in the first place. But if the client-
state controls were simply to ensure Israel’s security, Palestinian viability and
security could also have been ensured. Given its control over a range of
rents critical for the survival of the Palestinian quasi-state, Israeli strategies
of ensuring compliance by its client state could in theory have ranged from
integrationist strategies at one pole to asymmetric containment at the other.
As the terms suggest, an integrationist strategy would aim to create incen-
tives for compliance by rapidly deepening the economic integration of the
Palestinian and Israeli economies across all fronts. In contrast, asymmetric
containment would create large penalties for non-compliance by maintaining
and enhancing an asymmetric vulnerability of one side to achieve the secu-
rity aims of the other. We argue that while Israeli policy statements initially
suggested a commitment to integrationist policies, their policies on the
ground could only be described as asymmetric containment. The retention
by Israel of strategic points of control all over the occupied territories, and
the rapid construction of a system of checkpoints within the WBG were the
critical components of this system of asymmetric containment. This is one
reason why disagreements over small amounts of territory have been so
important in final status negotiations. Palestinian negotiators frequently
pointed out that in a prison, the prisoners control 95 per cent of the space.
The 5 per cent they do not control make it a prison. It appears that Israel
was unwilling to give up either the client-state system or its system of main-
taining asymmetric containment within the client state. We argue that many
of the most important governance failures in the Palestinian territories were
directly connected with the management of such a client state.
It is in this context that the other rents and interventions of the PNA
have to be assessed. Apart from the rents created by external powers, the
Authority created, allocated and extracted its own rents. Some of these rents
were undoubtedly damaging rents. These included predatory extortions and
monopoly profits for privileged individuals. Clearly there were some embry-
onic predatory characteristics within the client state, and if these activities
had considerably expanded, the client state could have collapsed into a full-
fledged predatory state. While many of the factors supporting the further
development of predatory rents were internal to Palestinian society, external
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containment also played an important part. The more constrained economic
development becomes because of containment, the more likely it is that a
political leadership will engage in short-term predation rather than attempt
long-term development. At the same time, the Palestinian quasi-state also
had to manage considerable redistributive transfers to maintain political
stability, particularly by creating jobs in the public sector and in the security
forces. These transfers were also rents, and there was a danger that the
emerging state might lose control over these rents. If so, these rents might
have become the subject of factional competition, with powerful factions
organizing to capture these rents. If this had happened, Palestine may have
become similar to many developing countries that suffer from fragmented
clientelism, where the state loses control over developmental allocations, and
political stability is threatened by the intense competition over redistributive
rents. We discuss the conditions under which this could happen in Palestine
and conclude that while it was a possibility, the conditions pushing the client
state to collapse into a fragmented clientelist state were relatively weak.
Finally, and given the context perhaps most surprisingly, there were
examples of developmental rents and rent-management capacities in the
Authority. These embryonic developmental characteristics of the emerging
state were supported and promoted by the PNA leadership, which was
strongly motivated by economic nationalism, and which had access to a
large group of expatriate Palestinian capitalists who could be potential
developmental partners of the state. These circumstances created opportuni-
ties of accelerating capitalist development that are not available to most
developing-country states. The Authority tried to take full advantage of this,
but given its limited fiscal and legal powers, it often used unorthodox
methods that appeared to violate good governance criteria. Thus, monopo-
lies and market power were often created for investors to attract critical
investments into a conflict zone. In other cases, Palestinian trading monopo-
lies were created that prevented the loss of some monopoly profits to Israeli
trading monopolies, and these enhanced the fiscal viability of the Authority.
The Authority also displayed a strong capacity to maintain internal political
stability in a difficult context. It managed rent transfers for stabilization
without letting the allocation of these rents get out of control. Thus, there
were some limited, but extremely important, developmental rent-manage-
ment capacities of the client state. If the client-state status could have been
overturned and full sovereignty attained, and if policy-makers had been able
to identify and strengthen these capacities, the outcome might have been
quite promising for Palestinian development.
In Chapter 2 by Hilal and Khan, the conditions supporting the develop-
ment of each of these sets of state characteristics and capacities are
extensively discussed. This chapter draws on other chapters and presents
both a historical analysis of state formation in Palestine as well as an eval-
uation of policy options. Our analysis identifies a number of different
constraints that have to be addressed if there is to be viable progress in the
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future not only towards state formation but also towards sustainable
reductions in corruption or progress in democratization. Palestinian
popular aspirations were to achieve rapid outcomes in terms of statehood,
democracy and a corruption-free society. These aspirations for outcomes
have to be distinguished sharply from the analysis of the good governance
and neo-patrimonial frameworks that identify democracy and the reduc-
tion of corruption as instrumental preconditions for the formation of a
viable state. Our reading of the historical evidence suggests that the
achievement of sustainable democracy and low corruption are themselves
dependent on the construction of viable and dynamic economies and states.
Long-run state viability has, historically, not been dependent on initial
levels of corruption or democracy, but rather on the ability or otherwise of
their states to push through developmental transformations. This has been
a critical precondition for reducing corruption and entrenching democracy
in sustainable ways.
To assess whether Palestinian demands for democracy and good gover-
nance are going to be furthered by the growing external pressure in pushing
good governance reforms as preconditions for progress, we need to ask
whether these reforms are likely to enhance the developmental and transfor-
mation capacities of the Palestinian state. In Chapter 2 by Hilal and Khan,
we note that following the failure of the Camp David talks and the begin-
ning of the Second Intifada in 2000, a number of governance reforms were
imposed on the PNA that enhanced transparency and weakened the central-
ization of power in the hands of the executive. Far from increasing the
chances of successful state formation along the two-state route, our analysis
suggests that these reforms may have a negative effect on sustainable state
formation given that the external constraints have not been addressed and
are not likely to be addressed in the near future. Weakening the Palestinian
executive in such a context may have the effect of reducing rather than
enhancing the viability of a future quasi-state.
In terms of policy, our analysis suggests that observations of governance
failures in Palestine (such as corruption, rent-creation, or weak democratic
processes) fall into three categories. First, many of the most damaging
governance failures under the PNA were directly caused or encouraged by
the framework of control that Israel insisted on and that was deliberately
created under Oslo and related agreements as a necessary part of a partic-
ular route of state formation. For instance, executive centralization was a
design feature of the quasi-state created under Oslo, and was required to
ensure the security-first conditions that Israel insisted on. Many governance
failures followed directly from this constitutional arrangement. Similarly,
much of the corruption at borders and checkpoints was directly the product
of a complex system of restrictions. Another example is the way in which
Israel paid part of the Palestinian tax revenues it collected into special
accounts controlled by the Palestinian presidency. These arrangements
assisted both sides to further objectives that could not be achieved with
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transparency, but they also manifested themselves as serious failures of
governance. A second category of governance failures had genuinely
internal causes and had straightforward negative effects. These failures could
and should have been the focus of reform policies. Thus, some aspects of
arbitrariness in decision-making were clearly dysfunctional. There was also
evidence of predatory behaviour associated with a lack of accountability
within the authority, particularly at lower levels of the security apparatus.
But a third category of apparent governance failures was particularly
interesting because these ‘failures’ described the PNA’s responses to external
constraints and its attempts to break out of these constraints. These
responses were governance failures from the perspective of the good gover-
nance framework. But, paradoxically, they were reasonably efficient
developmental responses that improved economic and political outcomes
given the alternatives available. For instance, the PNA’s allocation and
management of contracts, and its creation of some monopolies created and
managed high returns for investors in a way that maintained high rates of
productive investment in a conflict-zone. Expatriate Palestinian investors
had to be compensated not only because of the risk of conflict, but also
because there was no guarantee that the territories would not be taken back
by Israel, and their ‘property rights’ lost. The Authority demonstrated some
surprising capacities in recognizing and managing these incentives, and
managed to maintain high rates of private investment in an otherwise
unfavourable environment. In many cases, it also ensured that these invest-
ments remained productive. In addition, redistribution to maintain political
stability was also effectively managed from the centre, which did not lose
control, say to warlords or to fragmented clientelism. In achieving these
things, the authority often had to override theoretical good governance
criteria. The importance of these capacities is not recognized in the good
governance framework. Consequently, uncritically applying that framework
to drive policy may result in a significant destruction of vital state capacities.
Identifying these distinctions between types of governance problems is
important for prioritizing areas of reform. They are equally important for
locating the external institutional and political issues beyond the internal
governance ones that need to be addressed if an emerging Palestinian state is
to be viable.
The possibility that the emerging Palestinian state could have developed
in a number of different directions is not surprising. It was at best an embry-
onic state, and its critical relationships with Israel and its own internal
constituencies were still being negotiated. While it did have some serious
governance problems, only some of these were entirely due to its internal
failures, many more were related to the peculiar security and rent-transfer
arrangements that the PNA had little power to change. Most importantly, it
also had areas of positive developmental potential and it displayed some
significant developmental rent-management capacities that should have been
further encouraged and developed. The task of future policy must be to
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identify and strengthen these tendencies, and this must remain a major chal-
lenge for the future. While the PNA’s shortcomings in instituting democracy
and controlling corruption were very real, our analysis questions the
causality suggested by the new consensus. We are not sure that progress in
directly pushing democratization and anti-corruption, however desirable in
itself, would necessarily have aided state viability in this context. On the
contrary, progress in democracy and the ability to address issues of corrup-
tion were significantly blocked by the failure to sustain a rapid
developmental transformation, and this in turn was constrained by the
higher level institutional architecture governing the route to state formation
and relationships with Israel.
Addressing the relationship of the emerging Palestinian state with Israel
is therefore of fundamental importance in any discussion of Palestinian
state formation and viability. In particular, we have to ask whether Israel
really has an interest in allowing a viable sovereign Palestinian state to
emerge, or is it only interested in a client state. And even if it is only the
latter, is it going to allow an integrationist client state or demand a client
state subject to asymmetric containment. If Israel wants both a client state
and asymmetric containment, a two-state solution is not likely to be viable at
all. A client state with integration may be viable, and would require the
development of some appropriate state capacities. A fully sovereign
Palestinian state is the most desirable outcome. Given the incipient develop-
mental capacities observed in the PNA, there is a possibility that by
strengthening some of these early rent-management capacities, a sovereign
Palestinian state may achieve a rapid social transformation and thereby
remain reasonably viable. This in itself is an important policy conclusion.
Unfortunately, in terms of what is on offer, the actual possibilities are
exactly the reverse of the desirable ones. Only a client state with asymmetric
containment was on offer at Camp David, and is still on offer from the
Israeli government. Neither the Road Map, nor the informal Geneva
Accords signed by some unofficial Palestinians and Israelis in 2003, move
beyond these limitations of Oslo. All the indications are that Israel intends
to retain the capacity to inflict asymmetric pain on Palestinians through the
control mechanisms associated with the presence of a significant number of
settlements. The only difference is that even less territory was on offer after
2000. A client state with integration was ruled out by Israel in the early
stages of the Oslo period. It is unlikely that this route will be re-opened in
the near future given the demographic dangers for Israel if economic inte-
gration deepens. But a truly sovereign Palestinian state has not been on offer
at any time, and it is difficult to see how this can emerge from the ‘security-
first’ route that Israel insists on. The security-first route rules out Palestinian
sovereignty for an indefinite period. Till security is achieved, and this may
take years, and security may never be deemed to be satisfactory, Palestinians
under the security-first route will have to live under a client state. And if the
Israeli motivation for insisting on a client state is not just driven by security,
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but also by other considerations such as protecting the settlements or
broader concerns with other aspects of the Palestinian struggle, the client
state may turn out to be a permanent state of affairs. While Israeli motiva-
tions are not the subject of this book, an awareness of the implications of
Israeli strategies is critical for understanding the viability of the two-state
solution and of the governance failures that are likely to emerge in a
Palestinian state. The vulnerability of Palestinian state formation to these
Israeli motivations, and the dependence of Palestinian internal governance
options on Israeli strategies is one of the critical conclusions of Chapter 2
by Hilal and Khan.
Chapter 3 by Zagha and Zomlot examines the economic relationship
between Israel and the Palestinian territories under the PNA during the
Oslo interim period. These relationships were enshrined in the Paris
Economic Protocol and its one-sided interpretation by Israel. We argue that
these relationships defined a client state, and one based on asymmetric
containment rather than economic integration. Thus, this chapter records
the evidence and provides the background to arguments in other parts of the
book. Chapter 4 by Amundsen and Ezbidi looks at the operation of political
institutions under the PNA and points out significant areas of concern.
While the previous chapters look at governance in the broader context of
the challenge of transformation and the constraints set by the client-state
architecture and asymmetric containment by Israel, this chapter focuses on
how PNA governance appeared from below to Palestinians. It identifies
areas of concern that would need to be addressed if a sovereign Palestinian
state were to be achieved. Chapter 5 by Nasr examines the controversial
subject of the Palestinian monopolies. It elaborates the points made in the
chapters by Khan, and Hilal and Khan, about the need to distinguish
between different types of monopolies and different motivations driving the
creation of monopolies during this period. Some Palestinian monopolies
were indeed damaging, others were rational and possibly even efficient
responses to containment or to the problem of attracting investment into a
conflict zone with no final settlement in sight. Chapter 6 by Fjeldstad and
Zagha examines the tax administration system of the PNA. This again high-
lights the limitations on state formation set by the client-state architecture.
The bulk of the PNA’s revenues were collected by Israel, and Chapter 6
outlines the mechanisms that allowed this, and its consequences. Finally,
Chapter 7 by Hanafi and Tabar discusses the evolution of the Palestinian
non-governmental organization sector during the PNA period. This was an
important sector in terms of resource flows but it played a quiescent role in
state formation, and this chapter examines why.
Notes
1 Its internationally recognized name is the Palestinian Authority or PA, but many
Palestinians refer to their Authority as the PNA, a name that they believe reflects
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the claim of the Authority to be their future state in embryonic form. On the
other hand, other Palestinians argue that the Authority does not represent the
full national aspirations of the Palestinian people. We make no judgement about
the merits of the different arguments, and refer to the Authority in both ways.
2 Much of this was mainly symbolic, for instance, the passports were effectively
travel documents and the stamps were not internationally recognized. Foreigners
entering Palestine through Gaza International Airport had to go through Israeli
rather than Palestinian immigration checks.
3 The Oslo Accord signed on 13 September 1993 between the PLO and Israel was
a ‘Declaration of Principles’. This was followed by the ‘Agreement on Interim
Self-Rule’ signed on 4 May 1994 that established Palestinian self-rule in Gaza
and Jericho. The last main agreement was signed in Washington on 28
September 1995 and was called the ‘Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and Gaza Strip’ and this established the structure of the Palestinian
Authority.
4 The population of WBG including East Jerusalem was 2,895,683 at the end of
1997 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Population Census 1997).
The 1999 population estimates are also from PCBS.
5 The occupied territories were divided into a patchwork of territories designated
A, B and C. In zone A the Palestinian Authority alone was responsible for secu-
rity, in zone B security was jointly controlled by Israel, but in zone C Israel alone
was responsible for security. The Palestinian population in zones A and B thus
came under the Palestinian Authority. This arrangement continued until the
Israeli re-occupation of March 2002, when Israel took over security control in all
areas.
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